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Book Reveiws
The Law Of Maritime Personal Injuries. By Martin J.
Norris. New York. Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1959. Pp.
xliii, 553; with appendix and index. $17.50.
The subtitle of this book is "Affecting Harbor Workers,
Passengers and Visitors," a qualification which is extremely important to an understanding of its organization
and content. In THE LAW OF SEAmiEN (2 vols. 1951), the
same author discussed fully the legal rights of the seagoing
man, both in contract and in tort. Recovery for personal
injuries was covered in separate chapters on maintenance
and cure, unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act. The present
volume, a sequel to the earlier text, covers the maritime
rights of the non-seagoing person (a somewhat incongruous statement, which nevertheless accurately reflects
the law today).
Only forty pages of the present volume are devoted to
"Passengers and Visitors," so for all practical purposes this
is a treatise on harbor workers under the maritime law.
By far the most prolific producer of waterfront litigation
is the longshoreman. Numerically at least, shipyard
workers comprise the next most important group, although
the Supreme Court has imposed some limits upon their
rights of recovery.' Also included are ship ceilers, ship
cleaners, and others who service vessels while in port.
2
Had it not been for Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sieracki,
this volume would never have been necessary. It seems
incredible that in thirteen years one decision could have
given rise to a 553-page book, but that is the fact. Sieracki
held that a longshoreman was entitled to recover from a
ship for unseaworthiness causing him injury, a species of
liability without fault. Other categories of harbor workers
(with some limitations as to shipyard workers) were
blanketed-in later on the tenuous theory3 that they were
all doing a seaman's work. Failing to recover, these workers
can still get benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. Consequently the shoreside
worker now has more and greater rights than does the
seaman, for whose protection this branch of the maritime
I West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
'328 U.S. 85 (1946).
3 See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and The Rights of Harbor
Workers, 39 Oorn. L. Q. 381 (1954).
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law was developed. This is a topsy-turvy result, which
might be described as "two if by land, one if by sea," exworker actually has four separate and
cept that the harbor
4
distinct remedies.
Whether the harbor worker himself will benefit from
Sieracki in the long run is problematical. The long delays,
great expense, and lump-sum recoveries incident to this
type of litigation are all antithetical to the carefully considered philosophy of the Longshoreman's Act. In addition
Sieracki has promoted claim consciousness, unemployment
pendente lite, and an appalling amount of perjury.
Whatever may be said for the client, Sieracki has been
a bonanza for his attorney. Even counsel for underwriters
(of whom this reviewer is one) have not been heard to
complain about the large amount of business thus brought
their way. Lawyers from both sides of the trial table who
fifteen years ago did not know "port" from "starboard"
now walk with a rolling gait and talk like characters out
of Joseph Conrad.
From the standpoint of the text under the significance
of this situation is that the book is badly needed in port
cities by trial counsel in general practice as well as by
proctors in admiralty. It is a unique contribution to this
rapidly expanding field. By comparison, the most recent
general treatise on admiralty (GiLMoRE AND BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIALTY

(1957)), covers in 146 pages the rights

of both seamen and harbor workers, a subject to which
Norris has devoted three volumes.
Above all, the present treatise is an excellent review
of all the leading Supreme Court cases, virtually all the
pertinent decisions of the Courts of Appeals (particularly
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits), and many
important District Court cases, including a number from
the District of Maryland. As an encyclopedia of the law as
it existed, in early 1959 the book is defective only in having
a rather mediocre index. However, there is a valuable
bonus in the 54 page appendix classfying the cases, according to the nature of the accident involved.
Despite the vast amount of recent case law in this field,
numerous important facets of the subject have not as yet
been fully developed by the courts. However, the author,
taking the encyclopedic approach, makes little attempt to
'Judge Thomsen enumerated them in Blankenship v. Ellerman's Wilson
Line, New York, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 479, 483 (D.C. Md. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 F. 2d 455 (4th Cir. 1959), and added, "Longshoremen and
harbor workers have already ,been given a greater variety of rights and
choice of remedies than any other group of workers on land or sea."

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

fill in the interstices with original research, or discussion
of how the law will or should develop. GILMoRE AND BLACK,

and the older text by

ROBINSON, (HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1939) ) are somewhat superior

in this respect.
Consider an example. The almost uniform practice of
ship owners who have been sued by harbor workers is to
implead the plaintiff's employer under the 56th ADMIRALTY
RULE

or

FEDERAL RULE

14, as the case may be. The

owner thereby attempts to pass on to the employer any
liability which he may have to the harbor worker. Of
course, to the extent that he is successful in securing such
indemnity, the provision of the Longshoremen's Act that
the employer's liability thereunder shall be "exclusive"'
is circumvented. Nevertheless, this has received, the blessing of the Supreme Court.8
The Court has developed a theory that the indemnity
claim is actually not a claim for tort but for breach of a
contract by the employer company to perform its, work
satisfactorily. In many cases which are successfully prosecuted by harbor workers, there is some evidence of fault
on the part of both owner and employer. This has given
rise to a great deal of litigation involving the delineation
of the circumstances under which the owner should be
precluded by reason of his own fault from securing indemnity. The basic principle, as, enunciated by the Supreme Court,7 is simply that the ship owner may recover
over, "absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude
recovery." The limits of this rule are anything but clear
at the moment. Norris merely states the problem 'and
reviews the cases. A somewhat better discussion, of this
particular subject is contained in Kolius and Cecil,
Indemnity Suits by Vessel Owner Against Stevedoring
Contractor: A Search For the Limits of The Ryan Doctrine, 27 Insurance Counsel Journal 282 (1960).
Take another example. The seaworthy ship or appliance
which is warranted to the seaman and the harbor worker is
a vessel which is "reasonably suitable for her intended
service."8 Once it is determined that reasonable fitness
does not exist, the warranty is absolute. However, the injection of the element of reasonableness shows clearly that
-33 U.S.C.A. (1927) §905.
6Ryan Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956).
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., 355 U.S.

563,567
(1958).
8

Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 361 U.S. 808 (1960).
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the owner is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of
those on board, a principle which 'has been recognized by
the Supreme Court and other courts in general statements
to the effect that the owner is not obligated to furnish "an
accident-free ship."9 What, then, does "reasonably suitable"
mean? The courts have had comparatively little to say on
this fundamental question. Unfortunately the present
volume does not develop the subject.
One of the possible lines in which this part of the law
might develop was suggested by then United States District Judge Bailey Aldrich of Massachusetts in a humorous
speech before the Maritime Law Association several years
ago. Speaking on "The Training of an Admiralty Judge"
he said in part:
"A Judge's job is even easier than that. All he has to
learn, as you know, is to send every seaman's case to
the jury; and in straight admiralty cases, when in
doubt, to divide the damages, and probably neither
side will be sore enough to appeal.
To digress for a moment, in connection with this
matter of always sending a seaman's case to the jury,
there was a time when I thought that somewhere there
might be an exception. Suppose the plaintiff was so
grossly contributorily negligent, and the ship so free
of negligence, that it must be said that the injury was
due solely to plaintiff's own fault. Naturally, I figured a
majority of the Supreme Court would find an answer
to this, but it troubled me for a while to think what
it could be. The inspiration finally came, and I stated
it in a footnote to an opinion last spring. If a seaman
is as negligent as all that, manifestly it makes the
ship unseaworthy to have him aboard. Nor, in this
happy situation, would contributory negligence of the
seaman reduce damages, for the greater his negligence,
the more was the ship unseaworthy. It's very simple,
once you think of it."
Well, stranger doctrines than this have found their way
into the Supreme Court Reports. Take, for example, the
post-Sieracki decision in Alaska Steamship Co., Inc., v.
Petterson.0 There a longshoreman was permitted to recover from a shipowner for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness (without negligence) because of the failure of a
block belonging to the stevedores, brought aboard by the
9

Ibid.

10347 U.S. 396 (1954).
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stevedores, and used exclusively in the stevedores' operations in a part of the ship over which the stevedores had
exclusive control for cargo-handling purposes. It is not
surprising that juries, are sometimes incredulous when
charged that this is the law.
The doctrines with which this book is concerned seem
strange to this reviewer," not just because they are new,
not just because they favor libellants rather than respondents, but because they are so far removed from the
realities of maritime operations and so much at variance
with traditional admiralty principles. The most confusing
elements which have been injected into the general maritime law in the last forty years are the result not of
having "liberal" judges or "conservative" judges on the
Court, but of having judges unfamiliar with 'both maritime
operations and admiralty principles. The present volume
is an example of the large amount of ink which has been
spilt as a consequence.
DAvID

R. OWiN*

Professional Negligence. Edited by Thomas G. Roady,
Jr., and William R. Anderson. Nashville. Vanderbilt University Press, 1960. Pp. 321, with index. $10.00.
This is not just another book on negligence. It is a
series of specialized studies, largely by law professors,
on negligence in the "learned' professions." It includes
within its purview doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, architects and engineers, school teachers, abstracters, public
accountants, and concludes with undertakers, insurance
agents, and artisans and tradesmen. Approximately onehalf of the book is devoted to medical malpractice.
The chapter on the care required of medical practitioners
is a most rewarding and concise study of the subject.
The author has reduced generalizations to a minimum,
emphasizing specific problems such as the missing sponge,
the alleged warranty of recovery (growing in vogue), the
scope of res ipsa loquitur, the use of x-rays, admissibility
of text books, expert testimony, operations beyond the
scope of the original undertaking, experimental techniques,
the obligation of the general practitioner to refer patients
to the specialist, informed consent, and other problems, all
covered with a wealth of citations. In fact, the chapter
1And to much better qualified commentators, as well. See, for example, Chief Justice Stone's blistering dissent in Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 103.
* Of the 'Baltimore City Bar; A.B. 1935, M.A. 1937, LL.B. 1939, University of Virginia.
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is also virtually an encyclopedia of innumerable articles
in medical journals, law reviews, and text books.
This rather dour remark opens the chapter on the liability of hospitals:
"Throughout the common law world.., our generation has been witness to an unmistakable... trend of
increasingly disassociating the administration of accident law from the philosophy of individual fault in
favor of the collectivist principle of loss distribution,
as evidenced in the movement towards stricter liability
in litigation areas with a background of liability insurance. ..."
Generally, it has been well established that since staff
members are not subject to detailed control in the conduct
of their professional duties (as distinguished from their
administrative duties) by the hospital, there exists no
master-servant relationship between them; and therefore
the hospital is not liable for the negligence of its staff
in professional matters. This theory of non-liability is
being supplanted by: (1) a disregard of the conventional
approach that staff niembers must be subject to detailed
control of the hospital, in favor of the approach that the
staff is part of the hospital organization under the control of the hospital and the hospital is liable for its acts;
(2) the concept that the hospital by receiving the patient
for treatment undertakes a duty of care to the patient;
and, (3) a somewhat strained extension of administrative
duties to include professional duties. All of which is a
far cry from the old theory that hospitals were facilities
where patients could meet professional men for the purposes of treatment.
Prepared by the Legal Division of the American Medical Association, the chapter on malpractice insurance might
well become required reading by physicians. As there is
little case law on the subject, the Legal Division prepared
a questionnaire based upon actual claims. This questionnaire was forwarded to thirty-five insurance companies
writing malpractice insurance, requesting an opinion
whether or not these claims were within the coverage of
the policies issued by the companies. The questionnaire
was answered by twenty-two companies. The results disclosed that coverage may be denied in four general classes
of cases: (1) operative procedures, such as abortions,
which are criminal violations in the jurisdiction where
performed; (2) undue familiarity during a physical ex-
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amination; (3) warranties that an operation or procedure
will be successful; and (4) technical assault, such as performance of an operation, different from or beyond the
scope of the original operation. In most of these cases,
the majority of companies would defend under a reservation of right, reserving the right to refuse payment of
a judgment. It is interesting to note that this survey
showed that by and large the physicians of reputable
standing in a community are the ones generally involved in
malpractice actions. In conclusion, this cogent observation is made:
"The responses indicate that the malpractice
protection which the physician purchases
mined not only by the policy provisions but
extent by the underwriting philosophy of
pany."

insurance
is deterto a large
the com-

The chapter on modern trial techniques in malpractice
suits, by eminent California counsel, may represent techniques in California, but not in Maryland. It advises
".... that patient's counsel carefully and thoroughly condition the jurors' minds from the very onset to a psychological acceptance of this type of litigation . . ." by "intensely" questioning the jurors on their voir dire ". . . so
that -eventually even the judge will join with you in questioning the jurors as to their state of mind, upon these
subjects, so that by the time your jury is empaneled, each
and every one of them has been thoroughly indoctrinated
with the truisms of which you speak ..... " It is believed
that Maryland judges would take a rather dim view of this
approach, while defense counsel would suffer contempt of
court, apoplexy, or worse.
A study of the endless struggle to maintain discipline
in school children provides the main substance for the
chapter on the tort liability of teachers. At common law
the right to discipline was derived from the fact that the
teacher was in loco parentis; today it flows from the fact
that the will of the parent cannot defeat the policy of
the State in the maintenance of public schools. If the
teacher is charged with the use of excessive force, the
issue immediately arises whether or not the teacher has
gone too far and abused the privilege. In this situation
the teacher stands alone since the school authorities have
the immunity of their sovereign body; this also occurs
when a teacher is charged with negligenee. In some states
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these problems have been solved by insurance coverage or
by private indemnity for loss incurred by a teacher.
Significantly, the great majority of reported cases have
come from those states carrying private insurance coverage.
The chapters on pharmacists and on architects and 'engineers follow each other and are in marked contrast.
The pharmacist's duty runs for the benefit of third persons,
while that of the architect or engineer does not, a lack of
privity of contract between the third person and the
architect or engineer being a defense. As a result, much
of the chapter on architects and engineers is concerned
with the problem of privity of contract. The chapter on
pharmacists, by contrast, begins with a history of pharmacy when the pharmacist ".... was both physician and
pharmacist, just as the surgeon and the barber were still
one." It reflects what is believed to be the Maryland law,
citing cases long familiar to the Maryland lawyer.
While medical malpractice is at present the most
flourishing source of malpractice litigation,' lawyers were
among the first to be held liable for their negligence. Unlike medical malpractice litigation, legal malpractice litigation has decreased over the years. The attorney's liability
for negligence arises out of the attorney-client relationship, which is created by contract; but the action against
the attorney may be either ex delicto or ex contractu, there
being an implied contractual duty on the part of the attorney to use due care. The chapter is well documented,
with special reference to law review articles.
Where the injury is to persons, as distinguished from
injury to property, the courts, following MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 2 have granted a right of action to third
persons injured by the negligence of another. But, in commercial transactions the courts have refused to follow
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and have denied a right
of action to third persons who have suffered an economic
injury because they have been unable to find any duty to
a party not privy to the transaction. The doctrine of
privity of contract has bedeviled diverse, and seemingly
separate, fields of law, as evidenced by the various discussions in this volume; but in no field of law has it come
under more serious attack and scrutiny than in the law
of accountants. The strained and tortuous modifications
of this doctrine in its application to accountants, from
1 Estimated at 6000 cases in 1959.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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Derry v. Peek3 through Glanzer v. Shepard,4 the famous
Ultramares case,' up to and including State St. Trust Co.
v. Ernst,6 with shifting emphasis from fraud to gross
negligence (or gross negligence amounting to fraud), is
clearly and concisely set forth with voluminous reference
to cases, annotations, and law review articles in the chapter
on accountants.
The remaining chapters deal with the liability of
abstracters, funeral directors (at times a gruesome subject), insurance agents, and artisans and tradesmen. They
add little by way of informative discussion, but contain an
excellent collection, of cases.

G. C. A. ANDERSON*
Mobile Home Parks And Comprehensive Community
Planning. By Ernest R. Bartley and Frederick H. Bair, Jr.
Vantage Press, Inc., 1960. Pp. 147. $3.00.
The authors have apparently valid credentials for the
treatment of their chosen subject. Each has an interest
born of personal experience as a mobile home dweller
and nurtured by years of professional planning. Mobile
homes (the word "trailer" was long ago discarded by the
industry as both inexact and odius) are an evident adornment on today's landscape. Their use is increasing, and
the authors detail many factors in support of their view
that this trend will continue. Planning and regulatory
measures, in the opinion of the authors, have woefully
failed to keep abreast of this trend; the mobile 'home resident and the community at large have been the victims of
this failing. Planning and regulatory measures have been
inadequate and frequently reflect community antipathy to
the mobile home and its occupants. It is to the enlightened
correction of these failures that the authors devote their
work.
The subject is treated from its economic, social, political',
and legal implications. The authors conclude that from all
of these viewpoints, failures have been costly and unpleasant (a fact apparent to any observing traveler, in the
opinion of this reviewer). An intelligent solution to the
problems must begin with the planning phase and the
814 A.C. 337,58 L. J1.Ch. 864 (1888).
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
5255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
0278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938).
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B. 1921, Princeton University; LL.B.

1924, Harvard University.
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enactment of suitable regulatory measures including zoning, building codes, subdivision regulations, health and
sanitation, codes. The authors feel quite strongly that the
problems must be resolved within the framework of existing regulatory measures and that treatment of the problem
through separate regulatory measures would be a serious
error. They suggest and discuss workable legislative provisions for dealing with the peculiar features of mobile
home living which may be fitted into the framework of
existing measures. The book contains many valuable
references to sources for further study and the text is
supplemented with a valuable model ordinance which may
be adapted for local usage.
In the opinion of the authors, good planning in urban
areas requires allowance for mobile home parks in areas
zoned for multi-family residential use and similarly requires judicious placement of such parks within the zone.
In this connection, local readers may be interested to
consider the practice followed by the County Commissiorers of Howard County, as reported in Costello v.
Seiling.1 In urban areas, mobile homes should not be permitted outside of mobile home parks. In rural areas, on the
other hand, the individual mobile home should be permitted, but on a basis which will insure its removal and
relocation should the area be rezoned to residential.
Numerous methods are reviewed for dealing with the
existing substandard mobile homes and parks, and for
insuring their improvement or eventual amortization. This
the authors believe can be accomplished by applying
existing and familiar regulatory measures relating to substandard housing.
The authors have treated this subject in an interesting
and authoritative manner. No one can seriously doubt their
conclusion that failure to deal intelligently with the mobile home and its location has created problems that communities can ill afford. Their facts, discussions, and suggestions can provide helpful insights in achieving solutions
to these problems. While certainly of interest to the lawyer
in general practice, the book will be of unquestionable
value to professional planners and to drafters of regulatory
measures.
C. STANLEY BLARn*
1223 Md. 24,161 A. 2d 824 (1960).
* Of the Harford County Bar; B.S. 1950, LL.B. 1953, University of
Maryland.
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Reflections With Edmund Burke. By Timothy E.
Sheehan. Vantage Press, Inc., New York. 1960. Pp. 288.

$5.00.
Woodrow Wilson was insisting sixty years ago that
"Burke was right" about the French revolution, and more
recently Professor Talmonr has demonstrated that the
Jacobins were the first totalitarians (THE RISE OF ToTALITARIAN DEMocRAcy (1952)).
This makes Burke the first
anti-totalitarian ideologue and polemicist, and he remains
to this day incomparably the greatest. So it is natural
that a world hastening to rehabilitate its moral (so much
more vital than its military) defenses against the grimmest
totalitarianism of all should turn again to the oratorstatesman-philosopher who reflected on the French Revolution 200 years ago.
Former Congressman Sheehan has made this turn and
like his fellow seekers has found a trove of political and
social wisdom. In this book he offers a kind of concordance
of Burke quotations running from "Absurdity," "Accidental Causes," "Accountant," and "Accusers," to "Words,"
"Worth," "Writers," and "Youth." In the somewhat haphazard and non-categorizing character of the head-words,
however, the quality of the book is pretty clearly shown.
In brief, if it is the love's labor of an amateur of Burke, it
is also a somewhat amateurish job.
Mr. Sheehan gives his quotations without page references, so we cannot readily check context or wider relevance. He does not even tell us what edition of Burke
he uses, whether the 8-volume Bohn or the 12-volume
Little, Brown recommended for British and American
readers, respectively, by the Burke scholars at the "Burke
Factory" in Sheffield (England), who are bringing out the
definite 10-volume edition of the Burke correspondence.
But it is somewhat pointless to criticize a man because
he hasn't done something he never intended doing anyway. Within his own design for an unpretentious book of
Burke maxims and aphorisms, Mr. Sheehan 'has done well
for the general reader. And he provides at least a jumpingoff place for some who may discover a desire to go into the
large Burke literature in a more searching way.
C. P. IvEs*
* AB. 1925, Brown University; M.A. 1938, Yale University; member of
the Editorial Staff of The Sun, Baltimore. Editorial Board, Burke Newsletter.

